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Abstract
Deep convolutional neural networks can be highly vulnerable to small perturbations
of their inputs, potentially a major issue or limitation on system robustness when
using deep networks as classifiers. In this paper we propose a low-cost method
to explore marginal sample data near trained classifier decision boundaries, thus
identifying potential adversarial samples. By finding such adversarial samples it is
possible to reduce the search space of adversarial attack algorithms while keeping
a reasonable successful perturbation rate. In our developed strategy, the potential
adversarial samples represent only 61% of the test data, but in fact cover more than
82% of the adversarial samples produced by iFGSM and 92% of the adversarial
samples successfully perturbed by DeepFool on CIFAR10.
1 Introduction
Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNNs) have seized the attention of researchers throughout
computer science and computer vision, with its usage nearly ubiquitous. Very troubling, however,
is that DCNN models have been shown Szegedy et al. (2013) to be sensitive to small perturbations
in the input data, even perturbations so subtle that the human eye cannot distinguish the perturbed
image from the original, and this, disturbingly, with DCNNs which otherwise were believed / tested
to have high accuracy and robustness.
It is at or near to the classification boundary where a given DCNN typically has problems with
the samples near the decision boundary, precisely because standard DCNN loss functions do not
specifically consider any aspects of the decision boundaries, such as margin of separation between
classes. In this paper, we propose a low-cost method to determine the samples near the decision
boundaries and by selecting those samples, the search space of adversarial methods will be smaller
and assists in finding samples for potential adversarial attack, in order to more thoroughly be able
to train for and validate algorithm robustness. Our proposed method find samples near the decision
boundaries using SVM and selecting its support vectors, on the basis of having full access to the
target model, as in standard white-box attacks.
2 Related work
Adversarial attacks are essentially a means of assessing network robustness. Broadly, there are two
different types of attack: white-box and black-box Liu et al. (2016), Chen et al. (2017). In white-box
attacks an attacker has full access to the network model’s parameters, whereas in black-box attacks
the attacker has access only to network inputs and outputs, but not to any internal parameters. In this
paper two white-box methods, iterative-Fast Gradient Sign Method (iFGSM) Kurakin et al. (2016)
and DeepFool Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016), are utilized.
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) as a conventional machine learning method have been evaluated
against adversarial attacks Biggio et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2012), Biggio et al. (2013); however,
with the emergence of deep learning the focus of adversarial research has moved towards DCNNs. It
33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019), Vancouver, Canada.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
06
40
9v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
3 D
ec
 20
19
has shown that using SVM together with a DCNN achieves a higher accuracy than DCNNs alone on
some datasets Tang (2013), suggesting that there are limitations or drawbacks with the classifier part
of DCNNs. In Kim et al. (2015), the authors showed that the generalization problem of a DCNN
can be handled by support vector data description (SVDD), a type of SVM. Liang et al. Liang et al.
(2017) proposed a soft margin softmax loss to improve the discriminative power of DCNN, however
the DCNN problems go beyond softmax layer. Elsayed et al. Elsayed et al. (2018) proposed a large
margin loss function for DCNNs that creates a model which not only has a higher accuracy on the
evaluated datasets but also is more robust against adversarial perturbations. Khoury et al. Khoury
and Hadfield-Menell (2018) proposed a geometric framework to investigate geometric properties of
adversarial examples. They argued that the adversarial samples are the consequence of learning the
decision boundaries on a low-dimensional manifold, which is not sufficiently generalized to the actual
manifold of data. Jiang et al. Jiang et al. (2018) proposed a metric for calculating the generalization
gap of a DCNN model based on the marginal distribution at some layers of the network.
2.1 iFGSM
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) was first proposed by Goodfellow et al. Goodfellow et al.
(2014) for generating Xadv from an input image X . It uses the sign of the gradient (∇) of the loss
function l() of the network:
Xadv = X +  sign(∇X l(X,Ytrue)) (1)
Here,  is a positive constant and determines the size of perturbation. A more powerful variation
of FGSM is iterative-FGSM (iFGSM) Kurakin et al. (2016), whereby FGSM is undertaken in n
iterations with a smaller perturbation α = n in each step:
Xt+1 = Xt + α sign(∇X l(Xt, Ytrue)) Xadv = Xn (2)
In iFGSM, the perturbation is bounded by l∞norm to , meaning that the maximum perturbation for
each input pixel x is itself bounded by .
2.2 DeepFool
DeepFool Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) is an accurate approach for constructing adversarial
examples based on the distance of samples to the closest decision boundary. Deepfool tries to find the
minimum perturbation r that changes the output of function f() if added to input x. The algorithm
assumes that f() is an affine binary classification function and estimates the perpendicular distance
and direction from the input x to the decision boundary f(x) = 0. The calculated perturbation r
is multiplied by a constant 1 + ζ to ensure that x crosses the decision boundary, resulting in a net
perturbation of δ:
δ = r · (1 + ζ) Xadv = X + δ (3)
3 Methodology
In machine learning a shallow model like SVM tries to find a decision boundary that has the largest
margin of separation between classes. The resulting optimization problem is tractable when the
complexity of the data is low; however, for problems of very high dimensionality (common in image-
related classification) the complexity can be problematically high, so we desire an alternative strategy
for finding marginal samples. In contrast, deep models handle complex data very well, however they
cannot (in general) handle data which are near decision boundaries, so they are sensitive to small
perturbations of those samples. Since DCNN models do not explicitly model or penalize classification
decision boundaries, and as a result they can be vulnerable to small, even infinitesimal, changes
on such input samples. Our method proposes the following steps for finding Potential Adversarial
Samples (PAS):
1. Based on loss function l(X,Ytrue), model f() is trained. The test data X are fed to the
model, and the outputs of the last convolutional layer of correctly classified samples Xf are
saved.
2. A one-versus-rest SVM model is trained on the saved features of the previous step. The
SVM is not overfitted, in which case its decision boundaries are close to those of f().
3. The resulting support vectors of the trained SVM, which will be near to the SVM classifica-
tion boundaries, represent our potential adversarial samples.
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Figure 1: The proposed framework to select support vectors as the PAS, here shown for CIFAR10. In
(A) the test inputs transfer to the feature space; and in (B), the support vectors (PAS) are selected.
Note that the framework selects support vectors from the test data.
To assess the above, test samples are perturbed using two different adversarial attack algorithms, such
as iFGSM and DeepFool, and the degree of commonality or overlap between our selected PAS and
the adversarial samples will be measured.
4 Experimental Setup
Two different convolutional neural network (CNN) models are used on two different datasets.
LeNet LeCun et al. (1998) is used as the simplest network, with two convolutional layers, ap-
plied to the MNIST dataset. The VGG19 network, one of the biggest networks in the field of deep
learning with 19 convolutional layers, was evaluated on CIFAR10. CIFAR10 has 60, 000 samples, of
which 50, 000 samples are selected for training and the remainder for testing. MNIST has 60, 000
training samples and 10, 000 testing samples. Both datasets have 10 classes. As summarized in
Figure 1, the PAS are selected among the testing data of the datasets which are correctly classified by
the CNN models.
The SVM model requires the selection of parameter C, which tunes the SVM to be closer to soft-
or hard-margin. In other words, smaller values of C lead the SVM to allow some samples be in the
marginal area; as C is increased SVM becomes increasingly hard-margin, in which greater penalties
are asserted for samples in the marginal area.
Other important experimental parameters are  for iFGSM and δ for DeepFool, parameters which
define the maximum amount of perturbation which the algorithm can employ on a sample in the
l∞ − norm space.
5 Experimental Results
The LeNet network accuracy on the MNIST test set is 98.23%, meaning that 9823 samples out
of 10, 000 dastaset testing samples are correctly classified. Attack algorithms seek to change the
decision of the network on some of those 9823 samples by perturbing the inputs.
Table 1 shows the overlap between the PAS, which are selected by SVM models with different C
parameters, and the testing samples which were successfully perturbed by iFGSM with different 
and DeepFool with different δ values on the MNIST dataset, based on the LeNet network. As shown
in the iFGSM part of Table 1, the PAS cover a minimum of 60% of the adversarial samples while the
search space of the model is reduced to less than 25% of the input samples, with similar results in the
bottom half of Table 1 corresponding to DeepFool. The results suggest that the selection of PAS is
only weakly dependent on the attack algorithm, and is instead related to the data distribution and the
decision boundaries.
The MNIST dataset is too small and straightforward to meaningfully evaluate all the challenges
of the proposed idea. So, a larger network model and a more complex dataset is needed. The
VGG19 network correctly classifies 9228 samples of 10, 000 testing samples of CIFAR10. These
9228 samples are the search space of attack algorithms.
The top (iFGSM) part of Table 2 illustrates the number of samples which are common between the
PAS and the adversarial samples of the iFGSM algorithm, as a function of . The results show that we
can reduce the search space of adversarial attack algorithms as we need and on that search space we
will cover most of adversarial samples which are selected by the iFGSM algorithm. In comparison
with MNIST dataset the variation of the CIFAR10 dataset is higher and in a result the number of
adversarial is more than MNIST dataset. It means the decision boundary of the feature space is more
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Table 1: The number of common samples between PAS and those which are successfully perturbed
by iFGSM and DeepFool, here based on the LeNet network trained on the MNIST dataset. The
coverage will clearly increase with the number of support vectors, which in turn depends on SVM
parameter C.
SVM C Parameter 5 2 1 0.5
SVM Training Accuracy (%) 100 99.94 99.82 99.68
Total Number of SV 1239 1436 1763 2274
iFGSM
 Num Adversarial samples found by iFGSM Number of Samples in common
0.0001 1 1 1 1 1
0.0005 2 2 2 2 2
0.001 5 4 5 5 5
0.005 26 25 26 26 26
0.01 69 67 68 69 69
0.05 500 429 457 471 493
0.1 1903 983 1108 1284 1482
DeepFool
δ Num Adversarial samples found by DeepFool Number of Samples in common
0.0001 1 1 1 1 1
0.0005 2 2 2 2 2
0.001 2 2 2 2 2
0.005 13 12 13 13 13
0.01 26 25 26 26 26
0.05 194 189 190 192 194
0.1 512 448 475 490 505
Table 2: As in Table 1, but now for VGG19 trained on CIFAR10. Boldfaced values are those which
show a high coverage of adversarial examples but with relatively few support vectors.
SVM C Parameter 500 100 10 1 0.5 0.1 0.035
SVM Training Accuracy (%) 99.98 99.89 99.81 99.67 99.62 99.29 99
Total Number of SV 195 290 554 1273 1699 3508 5633
iFGSM
 Adversarial Samples found by iFGSM Number of Samples in common
0.0001 13 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
0.0005 64 60 64 64 64 64 64 64
0.001 129 97 118 127 129 128 129 129
0.005 818 184 277 476 747 748 818 818
0.01 1801 192 286 534 1126 1288 1743 1799
0.05 4819 194 288 550 1267 1663 3255 4291
0.01 5636 194 288 551 1268 1666 3335 4603
DeepFool
δ Adversarial samples found by DeepFool Number of Samples in common
0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.0005 15 13 15 15 15 15 15 15
0.001 26 24 26 26 26 26 26 26
0.005 146 108 133 145 146 146 146 146
0.01 314 150 212 292 314 314 314 314
0.05 1615 193 287 539 1096 1291 1572 1609
0.01 3667 194 288 550 1236 1603 2726 3376
complicated than the one of MNIST dataset. However, the CNN model here is VGG19 which is
much bigger than LeNet and its features space is more complicated.
The DeepFool part of Table 2 shows the same results for the DeepFool algorithm. As illustrated in
that part of table, with the parameter value δ equal to or less than 0.0001, the DeepFool algorithm
can not perturb any test sample and in general, due to its step size, the algorithm finds less number of
adversarial samples than those iFGSM finds in a search area (neighborhood) in l∞ − norm space.
However, the DeepFool can perturb any test sample in a fair number of iterations.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examined the test samples assigned on the basis of the support vectors of an SVM model,
itself trained on the DCNN features, leading to a proposed method which is a low-cost and fast
method to identify potential adversarial samples. It is near-boundary samples upon which small
perturbations are more likely to fool the network, and it is this understanding which helps adversarial
attack algorithms to reduce their search space.
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To make an algorithm more defensive, a straightforward strategy is to add those adversarial examples
into the training set and to retrain the model again. This resistance to adversarial examples is encoded
in the training phase, causing the model learn those examples and to be more robust in dealing with
those examples. However, this defense mechanism is attack oriented, meaning that the model could
be vulnerable to unseen adversarial attack methods whose samples are not considered in the training
phase. In this case, using an ensemble classifier with a focus on potential adversarial samples can
improve the robustness of the model.
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